




intended (or at least acceptable), a practical semi-automated evolution support process with a “user in the loop” is used. At first an anomaly detection engine detects whenever a behavior is observed that contradicts the knowledge models and, therefore, can indicate an evolutionary change. In case of timed automata the anomaly detection method presented in [2] is used. This anomaly is, in a first step, reported to the user. At this point only the actual anomaly, the context it occurs in, and a limited amount of current properties and probable influences can be reported since only influences on the already observed scenarios can be considered. Deductions on the overall properties are very restricted at this point. If a decision cannot be made here, the changed behavior is added to the concerned knowledge models in order to evaluate the effects on the system properties in detail. This is done by an analysis based on the extracted scenarios that are applied on the plant or a simulation. The advantage of these steps is that the operator can be informed based on the overall NFR-related properties of the system. As a reaction the change can be reverted if unintended or, if it is intended, adapted scenarios and models can be treated as valid.



**Figure 2: Semi-automated evolution support process**

If there is no possibility for a proactive determination of the system properties (missing of simulation and no availability of the system for tests), an adaptation of the models during operation is the only remaining option and just the already observed changes can be evaluated. When an unacceptable influence is observed the operator can react accordingly. However, the scenarios observed after the occurring change can be compared to the stored ones in order to estimate the completeness of the adapted knowledge models.

To be more precisely, consider the following simple example: A conveyor system is responsible for transporting workpieces to a machine located at the

end of the conveyor system. Workpieces are detected by lightbarriers at both ends of all conveyors. A requirement on the throughput rate demands that the transport does not take longer than 60 seconds. A PLC collects the signals stemming from the lightbarriers and starts the transport when a workpiece reaches the first conveyor and stops it, when the workpiece reaches the machine. Conveyor speed can be parameterized within the PLC-program. A timed automaton (as a knowledge model) represents the transportation and is learned based on the observed signal traces by the learning algorithm in [2].

The automaton should just include signals related to the transportation. Therefore all I/O signals of the PLC are enriched by simple semantics and the learning algorithm is applied only on signals with the given semantic *workpieceDetection*. These are all signals stemming from lightbarriers. Accordingly, an analysis on the automaton enables deducing the transporting times by aggregating the transition times. Due to maintenance the motors of the conveyors are exchanged by motors with a higher slip resulting in a slower transportation. Unfortunately, the operator did not adapt the parameters in the PLC. During the first run of the plant the slower transportation is detected as a time-anomaly and reported to the operator after the workpiece passed the first conveyor. The operator can now decide if the anomaly is intended (or at least acceptable) or not. If he is not able to do this decision, for example due to a high complexity of the conveyor system, he can declare the anomaly as uncertain and the knowledge model gets further adapted during the transportation until a deduction about the fulfillment or violation of the throughput requirement can be done. If the requirement is violated the operator can react accordingly by changing the parameters in the PLC code.

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